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Economics Faculty Publish Articles in Prestigious Journals

Dr. Michael Richter, assistant professor of economics, and Dr. Alessandro Citanna, professor of economics, recently published articles in prestigious journals in their field.
Michael Richter Michael Richter
Richter's article, "Back to Fundamentals: Convex Geometry and Economic Equilibrium," was co-authored by Ariel Rubinstein of New York University and appears in American Economic Review, a top economics journal and multidisciplinary outlet for publications in political sciences, finance, accounting, marketing and more. Richter's research aims to extend the applicability of the notion of competitive equilibrium. By using an abstract notion of convexity, which was developed in mathematics to describe convex sets outside vector spaces, Richter's work promises to have useful applications in real estate economics as well as in the economics of market design for such disparate issues as the design of kidney exchange or of school choice. Citanna's work, "Incentive Efficient Price Systems in Large Insurance Economies With Adverse Selection," has been accepted for publication by International Economic Review, a high-impact general interest journal. Co-authored with Paolo Siconolfi of Columbia Business School, Citanna's work provides insights into competition in the insurance markets, and is also related to the problem of market design.
Alessandro Citanna Alessandro Citanna
"Insurance markets are plagued by adverse selection problems, and it's been common belief for decades that competition would not work well in such markets," said Citanna. "Especially market anonymity and arbitrage seemed to be incompatible with efficiency - unless the market designer had enough statistical knowledge of the market participants and could suspend manipulative trades." In their article, Citanna and his co-author show that even though arbitrage is limited by adverse selection, price competition among intermediaries can result in efficient market outcomes without putting constraints on individual trades. They also show what type of incentive efficient outcome can be expected in such markets and how to compute it.